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Ralph Edmond Goad v. State of Nevada, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (Apr. 29, 2021)1 
 




 The United States and Nevada Constitutions forbid the prosecution of a criminal defendant 
who is mentally incompetent. Doing so violates the defendant’s due process rights because it 
prevents the defendant from having a fair trial. A criminal defendant has a procedural due process 
right to a hearing to evaluate whether he is fit to stand trial if there are sufficient doubts about his 
competency. Further, Nevada trial courts have an affirmative duty to order a competency hearing 
if there is any evidence before the court raising reasonable doubt about a criminal defendant’s 
competency. If a criminal defendant is denied the right to such a hearing, the Nevada Supreme 
Court often remedies the violation by reversing the conviction.  
 
This case poses three issues related to competency of criminal defendants. First, does 
reasonable doubt exist when a defendant is deprived of an unknown psychoactive medication 
during trial and thereby becomes debilitated? Second, must a trial court consider evidence of 
incompetence presented in pretrial matters over which a different judge presided? Third, is 
remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant was incompetent during 
trial an acceptable remedy for violating a defendant’s right to a competency hearing? The Nevada 
Court of Appeals answered all three questions in the affirmative.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
 
 Ralph Goad’s friend, Theodore Gibson, was found dead in his apartment on February 13, 
2019, from 250 stab wounds. The cash in Gibson’s wallet had also been stolen. Police found 
Goad’s DNA on the handle of a pair of scissors with Gibson’s blood on them, in Gibson’s 
apartment, and on Goad’s clothing. Goad was also seen entering and exiting Gibson’s apartment 
several times following the last day Gibson was seen alive. Goad was charged with murder with 
the use of a deadly weapon. During his interrogation, Goad told the police about his prior mental 
health hospitalizations, how doctors had struggled to diagnose his mental conditions, and that he 
had been prescribed several psychoactive medications.  
 
 Two different judges presided over Goad’s case: the first for pretrial matters and the second 
for the trial. The trial judge admitted that he was not familiar with what had happened in the case 
before it was transferred to his court. The court and counsel discussed the interrogation transcript 
outside the presence of the jurors on the first day of trial and again after opening statements when 
defense quoted an inadmissible line from the transcript. On the third day of trial, the court again 
discussed Goad’s condition outside the presence of the jury. Court staff informed the court that 
Goad had not received his medication that day, could not go without it, and had to be transported 
back to the sheriff’s office to take the medication. Defense counsel told the court that Goad’s 




1  By Maggie DiFederico. 
 On the fourth day of trial, Goad refused to interact with defense counsel, and when the 
judge questioned him from the bench, he gestured that he could not speak. However, he did nod 
to affirm that he wished to proceed with trial. Court staff also informed the judge that the jail 
infirmary had medically cleared Goad for trial. The court proceeded with trial without addressing 
the factors for determining incompetence.2 The jury found Goad guilty of murder with a deadly 
weapon, and the district court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole and 
a consecutive sentence of 36 to 240 months for the use of a deadly weapon. At sentencing, the 
court commented that Goad had nearly been involuntarily committed because of his mental health 
on five separate occasions. Goad appealed his conviction, asserting that the district court violated 




 Goad argues that the district court should have ordered a competency hearing because 
reasonable doubt about his competency to stand trial was raised when he was denied a necessary 
medication, refused to interact with his attorneys, and could not speak. He asserts that the court’s 
canvas of him on the fourth day of trial did not dispel the reasonable doubt. The State counters that 
a competency hearing was unnecessary because the court’s canvassing of Goad was sufficient to 
dispel reasonable doubt, considering his consent to proceeding with trial and the infirmary’s 
medical clearing.  
 
Due process  
 
 The Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s decision not to order a competency 
hearing for abuse of discretion.3 A court abuses its discretion and violates the defendant’s due 
process rights if it fails to order a competency hearing when a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant’s competency exists.4 A defendant is competent if he can consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has both a rational and factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him.5 Nevada’s competency procedure requires the court to suspend a trial 
if any doubt arises about the defendant’s competence and hold a hearing to determine whether 
further competency proceedings are warranted under NRS 178.415.6  
 
Nevada’s competency statutes  
 
 NRS 178.405 and NRS 178.415 provide a framework for courts to follow to ensure 
compliance with the due process reasonable doubt standard for competency. The statutes will aid 
the court in determining whether a competence hearing is necessary and whether the defendant is 
 
2  "[I]ncompetent means that the person does not have present ability to (a) [u]nderstand the nature of the criminal 
charges against the person; (b) [u]nderstand the nature and purpose of the court proceedings; or (c) [a]id and assist 
the person's counsel in the defense at any time during the proceedings with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding." NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.400(2) (2007).  
3  Olivares v. State, 124 Nev. 1142, 148, 195 P.3d 864, 868 (2008).  
4  Id.  
5  Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 179–80, 660 P.2d 109, 113 (1983).  
6  Scarbo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 118, 121–22, 206 P.3d 975, 977 (2009); Olivares, 124 Nev. at 1149, 195 
P.3d at 869. 
incompetent.7 However, even if the district court complied with NRS 178.405(1), the Court of 
appeals is required to find error if a defendant did not receive a competency hearing when 
reasonable doubt existed as to his competency. 
 
Procedural due process  
 
 In Nevada, a court is constitutionally compelled to order a competence hearing whenever 
there is “substantial evidence” that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.8 The court should 
evaluate evidence of incompetence in the aggregate, and once there is any evidence of 
incompetence, the court must order a competency hearing sua sponte.9 Failure to order a hearing 




 Reasonable doubt as to Goad’s competence existed on the third and fourth days of trial. 
Because the district court did not hold a competency hearing, it violated Goad’s due process rights. 
The court was required to consider the information in the interrogation transcript concerning 
Goad’s past mental health hospitalizations, medications, and failed diagnoses and failed to do so. 
The district court was also required to consider Goad’s behavior at the trial.11 The district court 
must consider all evidence before it to safeguard the substantive due process right not to stand trial 
while incompetent. The Court of Appeals cannot permit a trial court to overlook evidence because 
doing so would decrease the likelihood that a court will find reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s 
competency. The right to a competency hearing would then depend upon the trial court’s 
thoroughness in reviewing the record.  
 
 When viewed in the aggregate, the evidence before the district court presented a reasonable 
doubt as to Goad’s competence. The crime Goad was charged with (stabbing his friend 250 times 
and then repeatedly visiting Gibson’s apartment after doing so), Goad’s history of mental health 
problems and psychoactive medication use, denying Goad his medication, and that Goad was 
debilitated without his medication all suggested that he was either deprived of his prescriptions, 
suffered withdrawals, or was adversely affected by not taking his medications. Goad’s 
circumstances presented a reasonable doubt as to whether Goad was competent on the third day of 
trial. Goad’s competency was even more questionable on the fourth day of trial, as he could not 
speak and suddenly would not acknowledge defense counsel.  
 
 Although the State cites evidence that it contends contradicts reasonable doubt, such 
evidence does not relieve the court of its duty to order a competency hearing. Reasonable doubt of 
competence cannot be dissipated by conflicting evidence.12 Thus, the fact that the jail infirmary 
medically cleared Goad for trial and Goad’s nonverbal responses did not dispense of the need for 
a competence hearing.13 Further, Goad’s nonverbal response that he wanted to proceed to trial and 
 
7  See Olivares, 124 Nev. at 1149, 195 P.3d at 869. 
8  Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113. 
9  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 179–80 (1975); Krause v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 459, 463, 421 P.2d 949, 951 (1966).  
10  Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113.  
11  See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 
12  Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113. 
13  See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).  
defense counsel’s request that the judge canvas Goad did not waive Goad’s right to a competency 
hearing, because a defendant cannot waive his right to a competency hearing.14 A defendant does 
not waive his right to a competency hearing by failing to specifically request one.15  
 
 Thus, federal due process and the Nevada Constitution required the district court to order 
a competency hearing sua sponte. The Court of Appeals cautioned that its conclusion that there 
was sufficient evidence of a reasonable doubt as to Goad’s competence does not mean that it 
supports or opposes an inference that Goad actually was incompetent during his trial. The district 
court was tasked with deciding whether any of the evidence gave rise to a reasonable doubt about 
Goad’s competency. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not resolve any matter concerning Goad’s 




 Each time the Nevada Supreme Court has found that a district court failed to order a 
competency hearing when one was necessary, it has reversed the defendant’s conviction and 
ordered a new trial. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has not ruled that reversal and remand 
for a new trial are required. Appellate courts have remedied district court’s failures to order a 
competency hearing by ordering a retrospective, or nunc pro tunc, competency hearing.16 A 
retrospective hearing avoids the severe costs imposed by ordering a new trial for a violation that 
might not have affected the guilt and penalty verdicts.17 
 
 Before an appellate court can order a nunc pro tunc hearing, the district court must decide 
on remand that a meaningful retrospective competency hearing is feasible.18 A retroactive hearing 
is feasible if the court can reliably determine, based on the available evidence, the defendant’s 
competence at or near the time the reasonable doubt arose.19 Feasibility depends on the following 
factors: “(1) [t]he passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, 
including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) any statements by the 
defendant in the trial record, and (4) the availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts 
and non-experts, who were in a position to interact with [the] defendant before and during trial as 
well as any other facts the court deems relevant.”20 The trial court’s focus should be whether the 
hearing will provide the defendant with a fair opportunity to prove his incompetence, not whether 
evidence exists by which the trier of fact could make the determination.21 The burden is on the 
prosecution to convince the trial court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a retrospective 
hearing is feasible.22 
 
 In Goad’s case, vacating the conviction and ordering a nunc pro tunc competency hearing 
is an appropriate remedy for the district court’s failure to order a competency hearing. If the district 
 
14  Kraus, 82 Nev. at 463, 421 P.2d at 951. 
15  See Pate, 383 U.S. at 384. 
16  See Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2001). 
17  People v. Lightsey, 279 P.3d 1072, 1102 (Cal. 2012). 
18  See Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089–90. 
19  Lightsey, 279 P.3d at 1104–05. 
20  Id. at 1105. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
court determines that a retroactive hearing is not feasible, the conviction will remain vacated, and 
the district court will have to conduct a new trial.23 If the district court determines that a hearing is 
feasible, it should conduct the hearing in accordance with NRS 178.415. If the district court 
conducts a retroactive hearing and concludes that Goad was competent to stand trial, the conviction 





 Because trial courts have a duty to ensure that criminal defendants are competent to stand 
trial, they have an affirmative duty to order a competency hearing sua sponte where there is a 
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competency. To comply with this duty, a trial court must 
follow Nevada’s statutory competency procedures and also must consider all evidence of 
incompetence before it, regardless of whether it was presented pretrial or during trial. An appellate 
court may remedy a trial court’s failure to order a competency hearing when one was necessary by 
ordering the trial court to conduct a retrospective hearing to determine whether the defendant was 
competent during his trial. However, the trial court must first determine on remand that a 
retrospective hearing is feasible.  
 
TAO, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 The majority’s solution is one that Goad never requested, one that the Nevada Supreme 
Court has announced that district courts cannot order, one that does not apply to the facts of this 
case, and one that orders the district court to assess facts that Goad does not assert to be true. The 
majority concedes that the record does not contain sufficient information to assess whether Goad 
was incompetent on day four of his trial; for instance, there is no evidence about his precise 
diagnosis or what medication he took, and he was never examined by a psychologist during the 
trial.  
 
The scarcity of evidence is important because legal incompetence is a much higher standard 
than mental illness. Incompetence is measured by the defendant’s ability to understand the nature 
of the charges against him, the nature and purpose of court proceedings, and by his ability to assist 
counsel in his defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Competency is not 
determined by whether a defendant has a mental illness.25 Diagnosis of a mental illness alone does 
not raise reasonable doubt about a defendant’s competence to be tried.26 While some people do 
have a mental illness that is so severe that it renders them legally incompetent, the link between 
the two is too tenuous to say that mental illness can be linked to legal incompetence.27  
 
The remedy for this lack of evidence is not a retrospective competency hearing, because 
ordering one here turns the hearing into an open-ended investigation where the district court will 
have to seek evidence outside of the record rather than a focused judicial inquiry. And it directs 
 
23  See Id. at 1120. 
24  See NRS 178.420; Lightsey, 279 P.3d at 1120. 
25  Calvin v. State, 122 Nev. 1178, 1182–83, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006).   
26  Robinson v. State, 301 So. 3d 577 (Miss. 2020).  
27  See Id. at 582. 
the court to do so despite the fact that Goad has never requested such a hearing. The majority 
vacates Goad’s murder conviction not because the district court committed legal error in its 
evaluation of the evidence on the record, but rather because some other evidence might exist that 
was overlooked by the parties and never presented to the court.  
 
Requiring a nunc pro tunc hearing when it is uncertain whether concrete evidence of 
Goad’s incompetency even exists risks transforming his trial from an adversarial proceeding to an 
inquisitorial one where the judge conducts the investigation and decides what should matter to the 
parties. This is not how our justice system is supposed to work. When there is not enough evidence 
on the record to warrant reversal, the solution is to presume that the appellant has failed to meet 
his burden of proving he is entitled to relief. While the record here does contain ample evidence 
of mental illness, it contains none that Goad has ever been legally incompetent. Further, he never 
claimed to be incompetent at any time during his trial, did not assert an insanity nor a diminished 
capacity defense, and his counsel never told the district court that Goad was incompetent to stand 
trial. In reversing his conviction, the majority is essentially concluding that Goad’s defense counsel 
was incompetent.  
 
Goad admits that he has gone long periods of his life without taking medication, and yet 
he never claimed to be legally incompetent. And on appeal, his counsel expressly conceded that 
Goad has never been diagnosed or adjudicated as incompetent in his life, even when he was 
medication free. Goad did not even assert his incompetence in his appellate brief. There is no 
evidence that Goad was ever legally incompetent to stand trial for murder, even without 
medication. The majority remands Goad’s case to the district court for failing to “aggregate” 
evidence that Goad’s defense counsel never presented and do not claim actually exists.  
 
The scope of the majority’s remedy – a retrospective hearing – is much more narrow than 
the majority implies. Its purpose is to answer the question of legal competence, not to conduct an 
open investigation into a defendant’s mental health. Further, the remedy cannot be granted by a 
trial court with a post-verdict motion for a new trial; it is solely an appellate remedy. The remedy 
applies only to this court and this case. District courts may not employ it and the Nevada Supreme 
Court is free to disregard it. And because this is solely an appellate remedy, reasonable doubt will 
have to be determined by the appellate court, despite the fact that reasonable doubt regarding 
competency is a question of fact within the trial court’s discretion and which an appellate court is 
required to defer to the trial court.28 Therefore, the proper inquiry before the Court of Appeals is 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable 
doubt concerning Goad’s competency existed. 
 
The Court of Appeals reviews a district court’s decision to order a competency hearing for 
abuse of discretion.29 While Goad is mentally ill, there is little evidence that he was incompetent 
during his trial. He even admits that there is no evidence that he has ever been suspected, 
diagnosed, or adjudicated as legally incompetent at any time in his life. Neither he nor his counsel 
ever questioned his competency. The district court resolved several pretrial motions, and none 
raised any speculation as to his competency. Goad’s competency was never questioned at trial or 
 
28  Melchor-Gloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113; Ryan’s Express v. Amador Stage Lines, 128 Nev. 289, 299, 
279 P.3d 166, 172–73 (2012).  
29  Olivares, 124 Nev. at 1149.  
during the twenty-one months between his trial and this appeal. Further, he now only contends that 
he was incompetent for the first half of the fourth day of this trial. There is substantial evidence 
supporting the district court’s conclusion that it did not need to order a competency hearing.  
 
The majority’s remedy of remanding Goad’s case to the trial court to conduct a 
retrospective hearing because evidence of incompetence may come up is just not how the legal test 
works. The district court is not supposed to conduct a full hearing unless there is a reason to believe 
there is something to find. The district court was within its bounds to decide that the threshold was 
not met here and that a competency hearing was not needed. The standard of appellate review is 
abuse of discretion which requires the Court of Appeals to evaluate whether there was substantial 
evidence to support the district court’s factual conclusion as to Goad’s competency. The Court of 
Appeals has never assessed “substantial evidence” by speculating about evidence that is not in the 
record and was not presented to the trial court. “Substantial evidence” is assessed by evaluating 
the evidence that is actually on the record and determining whether it justifies the trial court’s 
decision.  
 
The bottom line is the question of whether Goad was incompetent during trial is a factual 
one which the district court answered based on the record before it and personal interactions with 
Goad. The Court of Appeals must defer to the district court’s observations, and whenever its 
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals must affirm its 
decision.  
 
